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The	uneasy	heirs	of	acquaintance*	
	The	writings	we	are	each	responding	to	focus	on	three	aspects	of	perception:				
Perceptual	relations:	the	person-level	relations	between	perceivers	and	external	things,	including	external	objects	(such	as	ducks	or	shoes)	and	events	(such	as	a	tree’s	blowing	in	the	wind),	that	constitute	our	perceiving	those	things.	
	
Phenomenal	character:	the	first-person	perspective	in	perceptual	experience.		
Epistemic	contribution:	the	contribution	of	perceptual	experience	to	empirical	knowledge.		In	The	Problems	of	Philosophy,	Bertrand	Russell	proposed	that	the	most	basic	building	blocks	of	thought	include	a	perceptual	relation	he	called	‘acquaintance’.	The	objects	of	Russellian	acquaintance	included	sense-data,	which	were	distinctive	of	perception	and	gave	perceptual	experience	its	phenomenal	character.	But	according	to	Russell,	the	objects	of	acquaintance	did	not	include	external	things	like	cups	and	shoes,	and	so	a	bridge	had	to	be	built	from	Russellian	acquaintance	to	our	knowledge	of	the	external	world.				Russell	inspired	an	approach	to	the	philosophy	of	perception	that	finds	a	close	relationship	between	these	three	aspects	of	perception.	A	major	strand	of	anglophone	philosophy	of	perception	in	the	20th	century	has	sought	to	vindicate	Russell’s	idea	that	our	knowledge	of	the	external	world	is	built	up	in	part	from	acquaintance	relations	that	determine	phenomenal	character,	but	with	an	important	difference:	acquaintance	would	be	a	relation	to	the	external	objects	that	we	end	up	knowing	about	on	the	basis	of	perception.	Led	by	Gareth	Evans’s	discussion	of	singular	thought	in	The	Varieties	of	Reference,	this	strand	of	philosophy	continues	Evans’s	effort	to	refigure	Russellian	acquaintance,	by	developing	theories	on	which	the	heir	to	perceptual	acquaintance	could	constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	our	experience	and	show	us	what	perceptual	experience	contributes	to	empirical	knowledge.	On	this	approach,	perceptual	experience	and	perceptual	relations	delimit	the	specifically	perceptual	part	of	the	mind,	distinct	from	judgments	formed	in	response	to	perception,	and	from	all	other	non-perceptual	capacities.	The	resulting	theories	belong	to	the	Perception	wing	of	a	wider	strand	of	philosophy	inspired	by	Cook	Wilson	known	as	Oxford	Realism.1		There	is	much	to	admire	in	this	strand	of	philosophy.	Our	abilities	to	think	about	particular	ordinary	things	in	our	environments	constitute	a	fundamental	form	of	intentionality,	as	Evans	and	P.	F.	Strawson	emphasized.	Subsequent	work	in	the	psychology	of	core	object	cognition	and	visual	object	tracking	give	us	reason	to	think	that	many	sophisticated	forms																																																									*	The	main	ideas	here	emerged	on	two	walking	discussions	in	California	in	2017:	with	John	Campbell	in	the	Berkeley	hills	and	Christopher	Peacocke	in	San	Diego.	I	thank	them	for	many	discussions	and	for	their	writings	on	perception	from	which	I’ve	learned	much	over	the	years.	For	helpful	comments	and	criticism	I	thank	Ned	Block,	Justin	Broackes,	Alex	Byrne,	David	Chalmers,	Jane	Friedman,	Matt	McGrath,	Zoe	Jenkin,	Geoff	Lee,	Jessie	Munton,	Katia	Samoilova,	Umrao	Sethi,	Nico	Silins,	Maja	Spener,	and	Scott	Sturgeon.		1	On	the	history	of	Oxford	Realism	see	M.	Marion	(2010a	and	2010b)	
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of	thought	depend	on	more	primitive	perceptual	capacities.2	Theories	of	perception	that	seek	an	heir	to	Russellian	acquaintance	respect	the	importance	of	singular	reference	in	the	mind,	and	they	give	perceptual	experience	a	properly	central	role	in	it.			What	features	of	perceptual	experience	enable	it	to	play	its	role	in	anchoring	demonstrative	reference,	and	in	providing	us	with	empirical	knowledge	about	the	things	we	perceive?	McDowell	and	Brewer	both	argue	that	these	roles	could	not	be	explained	other	than	by	giving	perceptual	relations	a	constitutive	role	in	both	phenomenal	character	and	epistemic	contributions.	In	this	way,	both	find	an	heir	to	Russellian	acquaintance	in	perceptual	experience.			For	McDowell,	the	contents	of	experience	are	individuated	in	part	by	the	objects	one	perceives	in	having	experiences	with	those	contents,	and	by	the	capacities	to	know	how	things	are	on	the	basis	of	perception.	In	recent	work	((2008),	(2013)),	McDowell	develops	a	view	of	these	contents	as	intuitional	as	opposed	to	propositional.	The	internal	structure	of	the	intuitional	contents	is	distinctive	of	perception,	as	opposed	to	judgment,	and	they	characterize	phenomenal	aspects	of	experience.	Brewer	defines	a	perceptual	relation	that	he	calls	“acquaintance	with	direct	objects	of	perception”,	and	argues	that	this	relation	both	constitutes	phenomenal	character	and	can	make	applying	a	concept	‘F’	to	the	object	‘evidently	correct’	((2001),	143).		In	both	cases,	perceptual	experiences	consist	in	a	kind	of	perceptual	relation,	either	entirely	(Brewer)	or	in	part	(McDowell).3					These	theses	give	a	straightforward	account	of	the	role	of	perceptual	experience	in	anchoring	demonstrative	thought.	They	entail	that	perceptual	experience	is	fundamentally	implicated	in	the	object-dependent	kind	of	intentionality	that	the	heirs	of	acquaintance	highlight.	And	once	perceptual	experience	is	construed	as	partly	constituted	by	perceptual	relations	to	external	objects,	any	epistemic	contributions	of	experiences	will	include	perceptual	relations.	There	is	then	no	gap	to	be	bridged	between	experiences	and	perceptual	contact	with	the	external	world,	as	there	was	on	Russell’s	original	picture,	because	experiences	–	when	they	are	not	total	hallucinations	–	partly	or	entirely	consist	in	perceptual	relations	to	things	seen.	This	constitutive	link	between	phenomenal	character	and	perceptual	relations	arguably	adds	significantly	to	the	epistemic	power	of	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience.4		Besides	locating	epistemic	power	of	experience	in	phenomenal	character	and	its	constitutive	perceptual	relations,	heirs	to	acquaintance	purport	to	delimit	the	distinctively	perceptual	part	of	the	mind,	so	that	both	perceptual	experience	and	the	routes	by	which	they	are	formed	become	locuses	of	pure	perception	that	explain	how	we	come	to	have	non-perceptual	forms	of	intentionality	that	are	supposed	to	rely	on	the	purely	perceptual	kind.	This	explanatory	priority	is	exactly	the	status	that	perceptual	experience	has	according	to	Evans	and	others	who	seek	an	heir	to	acquaintance.																																																										2	Carey	(2009),	Scholl	et	al.,	(2001).	3	Similar	positions	are	defended	by	Campbell	(2002),	Martin	(2004),	among	others,	and	in	much	more	epistemic	detail,	by	Dickie	(2015).	4	A	point	emphasized	by	Sturgeon	(1998),	among	others.	
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	I	think	this	picture	is	oversold.	Heirs	of	acquaintance	are	recruited	to	play	multiple	roles	at	once,	but	these	roles	can	be	dissociated.		Phenomenal	character	is	not	best	analyzed	using	perceptual	relations.	And	the	distinctively	perceptual	part	of	the	mind	is	not	reflected	in	either	perceptual	relations	or	in	phenomenal	character,	because	those	features	of	perception	can	in	principle	reflect	the	influence	of	non-perceptual	person-level	states,	and	quite	possibly	do	so	in	fact.	More	generally,	they	do	not	enjoy	an	informationally	unique	relationship	to	external	reality.	The	epistemic	contributions	of	experience	then	have	to	be	reconstructed	in	a	more	nuanced	way	than	heirs	of	acquaintance	suggest.	The	nuance	is	needed	to	capture	the	interactions	between	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	and	the	myriad	elements	that	can	shape	it,	and	to	explain	the	impact	of	these	interactions	on	the	epistemology	of	perception.	I	don’t	have	space	here	to	show	that	the	reconstruction	can	be	done,	but	I	take	my	responses	to	McDowell	and	Brewer	to	undermine	their	routes	to	the	idea	that	no	such	reconstruction	could	possibly	succeed.	The	Rationality	of	Perception	is	my	attempt	at	such	a	reconstruction.5		Although	my	approach	to	perception	and	Gupta’s	are	quite	different	from	one	another,	we	both	hold	that	the	roles	that	the	heirs	to	Russellian	acquaintance	are	invoked	to	play	come	apart	in	ways	that	the	perception	wing	of	Oxford	realism	does	not	allow.	For	instance,	we	agree	that	perceptual	relations	and	phenomenal	character	can	be	dissociated.6	But	Gupta	thinks	experience	makes	no	categorical	proprietary	epistemic	contribution	to	belief.		I	think	it	does.	So	here	I	agree	with	Brewer	and	McDowell.	But	they	seek	heirs	of	acquaintance	relations	that	build	in	to	perceptual	experience	features	that	would	make	it	contribute	all	by	itself	much	more	to	knowledge	than	I	think	perceptual	experience	can	contribute.		In	at	least	one	respect,	Gupta’s	departure	from	the	attempt	to	find	heirs	of	acquaintance	is	more	radical	than	mine.	On	my	view	of	perceptual	experience,	which	I	call	the	Content	View,	perceptual	experience	(in	the	visual	case	–	the	only	case	my	interlocutors	discuss)	is	fundamentally	implicated	in	intentionality,	but	not	in	the	object-dependent	kind.	Partly	as	a	result	of	this	feature,	it	is	a	locus	of	epistemic	power,	though	I	hold	that	which	powers	it	has	depends	on	its	relationships	to	other	mental	states	and	on	its	etiology.	By	contrast,	Gupta	denies	that	experiences	manifest	any	epistemic	powers	on	their	own,	and	he	sometimes	seems	to	suggest	that	they	are	devoid	of	the	kinds	of	intentional	features	that	I	think	help	bestow	basic	epistemic	powers	on	experience.	This	denial	puts	Gupta	at	odds	with	all	three	of	us.		Though	I	agree	with	Gupta	about	the	need	to	analyze	the	epistemic	impact	on	perceptual	experience	of	non-perceptual	mental	states,	I	criticize	his	framework	on	the	grounds	that	the	range	of	interactions	between	experience	and	non-perceptual	factors	that	it	can	express	is	too	limited.	My	main	differences	with	Gupta	thus	lie	in	the	relationship	between	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	and	intentionality,	and	in	the	type	of	epistemic	contribution	that	experiences	can	make.																																																										5	Siegel	(2017)	6	See	Gupta’s	SubjIdentity	relation	in	his	(2018).	
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	I	frame	my	responses	to	my	interlocutors	around	three	relationships	in	which	our	main	philosophical	differences	can	be	located:	(i)	between	phenomenal	character	and	perceptual	relations,	(ii)	between	perceptual	experience	and	perceptual	distinctiveness,	and	(iii)	between	phenomenal	character	and	the	epistemic	role	of	experience.		
	
	
2.	Phenomenal	character	and	perceptual	relations		How	are	perceptual	relations	to	external	things	related	to	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience?	McDowell	and	Brewer’s	answer	is	that	perceptual	relations	partly	or	entirely	constitute	experiences’	phenomenal	character.	My	first	set	of	responses	focuses	on	two	routes	to	this	position	that	I	find	in	the	writings	of	McDowell	and	Brewer.		Each	of	these	routes	addresses	a	more	specific	question:	how	does	the	fact	that	you’re	seeing	a	particular	ordinary	object	(a	cat,	a	shoe)	constrain	which	phenomenal	character	your	visual	experience	can	have?	Another	way	to	put	this	question	is:	how	does	phenomenal	character	constrain	the	object-seeing	relation?	More	generally,	given	an	object	o,	what	range	of	phenomenal	characters	are	admissible	ones	for	seeing	o?		These	three	formulations	are	all	asking	the	same	thing.		A	first	answer	to	this	question	is	that	phenomenal	character	is	individuated	in	part	by	the	objects	one	is	seeing	in	having	the	experience	with	that	phenomenal	character.	If	phenomenal	character	is	object-dependent	in	this	sense,	then	two	experiences	with	the	same	phenomenal	character	will	have	to	be	cases	of	seeing	the	same	object.	And	if	two	experiences	are	cases	of	seeing	different	objects,	then	they	have	to	differ	in	their	phenomenal	character,	even	if	the	experiences	are	or	would	be	indiscriminable	to	the	subject.			McDowell	and	Brewer	both	endorse	this	answer	to	the	basic	question	of	how	perceptual	relations	constrain	phenomenal	character.	I	focus	first	on	one	of	McDowell’s	routes	to	this	answer,	and	then	on	a	different	and	complementary	route	to	it	taken	by	Brewer.	I	take	my	responses	to	undermine	their	arguments	for	this	position.				
2.1		McDowell’s	appeal	to	Hume	McDowell	characterizes	perceptual	experiences	by	saying	that	when	you	see	an	object	such	as	a	cat	or	a	shoe,	it	is	“directly	presented	to	one’s	awareness”	and	is	thereby	“directly	there	for	the	thinker”,	for	instance	by	being	available	for	demonstrative	reference.	These	quotes	are	from	“The	Content	of	Perceptual	Experience”	(1994,	343).	Similar	formulations	occur	in	McDowell’s	writings	on	perception	since	then.	For	instance:	“If	an	experience	is	a	seeing,	we	can	say	the	representing	it	does	is	its	revealing	or	
disclosing	a	certain	environmental	reality:	that	is,	its	bringing	that	environmental	reality	into	view	for	the	subject.	Experiential	representing,	the	representing	by	experiences	that	consists	in	their	having	content	in	the	way	they	do,	comes	in	two	
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kinds:	bringing	environmental	realities	into	view	and	merely	seeming	to	do	that.	If	an	experience’s	representing	is	of	the	first	kind,	what	is	relevantly	constitutive	of	its	subjective	character	is	that	it	brings	a	certain	environmental	reality	into	view	for	its	subject.”	(2013,	p.	147)7	One	of	McDowell’s	reasons	for	thinking	that	in	the	cases	he	regards	as	primary,	experiences	are	intrinsically	encounters	with	objects	is	that	otherwise	it	would	be	impossible	for	us	to	be	perceptually	aware	of	external	things	at	all.	Here	McDowell	is	formulating	and	endorsing	a	version	of	this	idea,	which	he	finds	in	both	Kant	and	Hume:		 “What	Kant	takes	from	Hume	is	that	there	is	no	rationally	satisfactory	route	from	such	a	predicament	[in	which	experience	is	not	intrinsically	a	relation	with	objects]	to	the	epistemic	position	we	are	in	(obviously	in,	we	might	say)”	(344).		That	epistemic	position	includes	the	fact	that	we	can	demonstratively	refer	to	things	we	see,	and	go	on	to	know	facts	about	them	on	the	basis	of	perceptual	experience	–	at	least	if	these	things	are	‘glimpses	of	objective	reality’	(see	next	quote).			Starting	from	this	idea,	McDowell	develops	a	line	of	reasoning	he	finds	in	Kant	but	not	in	Hume:			 	“….since	there	is	no	rationally	satisfactory	route	from	experiences,	conceived	as…less	than	encounters	with	objects	–	glimpses	of	objective	reality	–	to	the	epistemic	position	we	are	manifestly	in,	experiences	must	be	intrinsically	encounters	with	objects.”(344)		According	to	this	line	of	thought,	there	is	no	way	to	see	objects	at	all	(if	seeing	is	a	way	to	‘encounter	objects’)	unless	experiences	are	object-dependent.	In	this	way,	perceptual	relations	are	supposed	to	be	explanatorily	prior	to	phenomenal	character.		But	why	do	experiences	have	to	be	object-dependent	in	order	for	us	to	be	perceptually	aware	of	things?	McDowell	suggests	if	the	phenomenal	character	of	experiences	is	something	less	than	a	perceptual	relation,	then	we	are	ignoring	a	point	we	should	have	learned	from	Hume.	Humean	ideas	are	not	individuated	by	any	external	objects,	and	neither	are	Humean	impressions.	According	to	McDowell,	Hume	“inherits	from	his	predecessors”	these	construals	of	the	perceptual	and	post-perceptual	elements	of	the	mind,	and	then	shows	that	given	these	construals,	we	could	not	be	perceptually	aware	of	objects.	
																																																								
7In	glossing	McDowell’s	views	and	more	generally	the	perception	wing	of	Oxford	realism,	I’ve	been	focusing	on	what	McDowell	calls	the	first	kind	of	experiential	representing,	ignoring	cases	such	as	hallucination.	I’ll	continue	to	ignore	the	cases	of	hallucination	in	discussing	Brewer	and	McDowell	(except	for	the	last	two	paragraphs	of	2.1)	since	they	do	not	regard	it	as	putting	constraints	on	the	correct	analysis	of	genuine	perception,	which	by	definition	involves	perceptual	contact	with	external	objects,	and	does	not	mislead	as	to	the	bit	of	reality	that	one	is	perceiving.	
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Any	representations	of	objects	we	end	up	with	would	have	to	result	from	more	than	perception.8		Here	McDowell	reads	Hume	as	holding	that	we	can’t	be	the	epistemic	situation	that	McDowell	says	we’re	obviously	in	–	in	other	words,	as	a	type	of	skeptic.	Even	if	one	reads	Hume	in	this	way,	why	think	he	arrived	at	that	position	because	experiences	were	not	“de	re	impressions”	constituted	in	part	by	external	objects	toward	which	they’re	directed?	Impressions	are	perhaps	the	closest	thing	in	Hume’s	writings	to	our	notion	of	perceptual	experience.	If	we	read	Hume	as	a	skeptic,	an	at	least	equally	good	explanation	for	how	he	arrived	at	that	diagnosis	of	our	epistemic	position	is	that	impressions	are	not	directed	toward	anything	at	all.9	The	idea	that	experiences	lack	any	sort	of	intentionality	would	create	the	need	for	a	bridge	from	experiences	to	rational	beliefs	about	the	external	world,	since	on	that	picture,	experiences	would	not	even	purport	to	present	us	with	any	ways	that	external	things	are.	The	blame	would	then	fall	on	the	more	general	point	that	experiences	would	lack	any	form	of	intentionality,	rather	than	on	the	fact	that	they	lack	a	specifically	de	re	form	of	intentionality.10			On	a	slightly	different	reading,	what	McDowell	thinks	Hume	showed	is	that	a	subject	can	have	experiential	representations,	only	if	the	subject	has	some	object-dependent	experiences.	‘The	epistemic	situation	we’re	obviously	in”	would	then	consist	only	in	having	experiential	representations,	whether	they	are	knowledge	or	not.	On	this	picture,	given	that	we	have	experiences	with	contents,	the	contents	of	experience	cannot	always	be	object-independent.		Hume’s	observations	provide	no	leverage	to	rule	out	that	experiences	have	object-independent	contents	by	virtue	of	its	object-independent	phenomenal	character.	The		Humean	idea	that	impressions	are	intentionality-free	is	just	a	denial	of	the	claim	that	experiences	have	contents.	It	isn’t	a	way	of	showing	that	the	contents	would	have	to	be	object-dependent.	To	reject	the	position	that	the	phenomenal	character	grounds	object-independent	contents,	an	argument	would	be	needed	for	the	explanatory	priority	that	McDowell	favors.	Brewer	gives	just	such	an	argument.		So	let’s	consider	it	next.				2.2	Brewer’s	argument	from	object-seeing																																																									8	The	full	passage:	“Hume	inherits	from	his	predecessors	a	conception	according	to	which	no	experience	is	in	its	very	nature,	intrinsically,	an	encounter	with	objects.	What	Kant	takes	from	Hume	is	that	there	is	no	rationally	satisfactory	route	from	such	a	predicament	to	the	epistemic	position	that	we	are	in	(obviously	in,	we	might	say).	Transcendental	synthesis	(or	whatever)	is	not	supposed	to	be	such	a	route:	the	whole	point	of	its	being	transcendental,	in	this	context,	is	that	it	is	not	supposed	to	be	something	that	we,	our	familiar	empirical	selves,	go	in	for.	It	would	be	a	mistake	to	think	we	can	domesticate	Kant's	point	by	detranscendentalizing	the	idea	of	synthesis,	so	as	to	suggest	that	the	idea	of	encountering	objects	is	put	in	place	by	interpretation	of	data,	perhaps	by	inference	to	the	best	explanation,	with	the	interpretation	being	something	we	do…	That	would	just	be	missing	Hume’s	point.”	((1994),	p.	192)).	
9	E.g.,	“Our	senses…never	give	us	the	least	intimation	of	a	thing	beyond”	Treatise,	1.4.2.	10	And	in	any	case	it	might	be	an	interpretive	mistake	to	read	Hume	as	denying	that	we	can	know	on	the	basis	of	perception	basic	facts	about	the	environment,	such	as	that	there’s	a	cat	ahead.	
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Since	McDowell	and	Brewer	think	perceptual	experience	plays	an	indispensable	role	in	anchoring	demonstrative	thought	to	its	objects,	let’s	define	“object-seeing”	as	the	cases	of	seeing	external	objects	that	put	you	in	a	position	to	demonstratively	refer	to	them,	and	treat	seeing	as	object-seeing.		For	a	particular	object	o,	such	as	Ducko	the	duck,	which	phenomenal	characters	are	admissible	ones	for	an	experience	to	have,	if	it	is	an	experience	of	seeing	Ducko?	In	the	previous	section	(2.1)	I	discussed	the	answer,	“only	phenomenal	characters	that	are	individuated	by	Ducko”.	I	now	turn	to	a	second,	complementary	answer	to	the	original	question	about	object-seeing	that	I	find	in	Brewer.11			As	I	reconstruct	it,	Brewer’s	positive	case	for	object-dependent	experience	has	three	steps.	For	each	object	o,	there’s	a	limited	range	of	phenomenal	characters	our	experiences	can	have,	if	the	experiences	are	cases	of	seeing	o.	The	limits	on	this	range	can	best	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	phenomenal	character	is	constituted	by	object-seeing.	So	a	constitutive	role	for	perceptual	relations	helps	explain	how	it	is	possible	for	us	to	see	objects	at	all	–	a	conclusion	that	echoes	McDowell’s	claims	about	what	Hume	showed.		Are	there	limitations	on	which	phenomenal	character	an	experience	can	have,	if	it	belongs	to	a	case	of	object-seeing?	I	think	so.	If	you	cannot	differentiate	an	object	from	its	surroundings,	for	instance	because	it	is	an	iguana	blending	in	with	a	shrub,	then	you	don’t	see	it	in	a	way	that	can	anchor	a	de	re	thought	to	it,	though	you	may	see	its	surfaces.	This	observation	suggests	a	Differentiation	condition	on	object-seeing:		 	Differentiation	condition:	If	S	sees	o,	then	S’s	visual	phenomenology	differentiates	o	from	its	immediate	surroundings.		The	Differentiation	condition	is	a	phenomenal	constraint	on	object-seeing.	Which	objects	one	sees	cannot	freely	mix	and	match	with	which	phenomenal	character	one	has	in	seeing	them.	For	instance,	you	cannot	see	a	duck	by	having	a	phenomenal	character	of	an	undifferentiated	blue	expanse.12			Are	there	further	phenomenal	constraints	on	object-seeing,	beyond	the	differentiation	condition?			According	to	Brewer	there	are.	When	S	sees	object	o	in	conditions	C	and	the	differentiation	condition	is	met,	there	are	only	some	ways	that	o	can	look	to	S.	These	constraints	“govern	the	kind	of	perceptual	error	that	is	compatible	with	genuine	presentation”	(p.	74).		For	instance,	if	you	see	your	house	from	far	across	a	valley	it	might	look	like	a	dot,	as	J.	L.	Austin	pointed	out.13	If	you	see	the	Müller-Lyer	lines,	they	might	look	different	in	length.	Both	experiences	might	give	rise	to	perceptual	errors,	but	this	role	doesn’t	stop	the	subject	from	seeing	the	house	or	the	lines	in	a	way	that	anchors	demonstrative	reference	to	them.																																																									11	All	quotes	are	from	Perception	and	its	Objects	(2011).	12	A	point	developed	in	Siegel	(2006),	where	I	defend	the	Differentiation	condition	more	fully.	13	Austin	(1962),	p.	98.	
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	Brewer’s	Object	View	of	experience	elevates	these	observations	into	a	further	phenomenal	constraint	on	object-seeing	beyond	the	Differentiation	condition.	The	further	phenomenal	constraints	are	rooted	in	what	he	calls	o’s	visible	similarities	to	paradigms	of	F.		If	an	object	o	affects	the	visual	system	as	a	paradigm	of	F	would,	then	o	is	visibly	similar	to	F.	Where	F	is	a	“perceptible	kind”	(74),		 “o	looks	F	to	a	subject	S,	in	virtue	of	the	fact	that	S	is…acquainted	with	o	from	a	point	of	view	and	circumstances…[in]	which	o	has	visually	relevant	similarities	with	paradigms	of	F.”	(118)		Given	a	paradigm	of	F,	an	object’s	visually	relevant	similarities	are	in	turn	supposed	to	be	fully	determined	by	the	conditions	in	which	the	object	is	seen:		 “…visually	relevant	similarities	[to	paradigms	of	F]	are	identities	in	such	things	as	the	ways	in	which	light	is	reflected	and	transmitted	from	the	objects	in	question,	and	the	way	in	which	stimuli	are	handled	by	the	visual	system,	given	its	evolutionary	history	and	our	shared	training	and	development”	(p.	103).			The	appeal	to	visually	relevant	similarities	is	meant	to	avoid	the	need	to	appeal	to	any	level	of	representations	on	the	part	of	the	subject	in	the	analysis	of	phenomenal	character.14		When	a	subject	S	sees	o	in	conditions	C,	the	only	ways	F	that	o	can	look	to	S	are	supposed	to	be	determined	by	o:	“The	way	things	look	are	the	ways	things	look…less	crudely,	the	ways	things	look	to	us	in	vision	are	the	ways	certain	specific	things	look	that	are	presented	to	us	in	vision,	given	the	circumstances	of	their	particular	presentation”	(4).		So	Brewer	holds	that	there’s	a	range	of	ways	an	object	o	can	look	in	conditions	C,	relative	to	a	subject	S,	defined	in	terms	of	visible	similarities:			 Similarity	range	(of	o	in	C):	the	values	of	F,	such	that	if	S	sees	o	in	C,	o	looks	F	to	S	as	a	result	of	o’s	visible	similarities	with	paradigms	of	F.			And	this	range	defines	Brewer’s	proposed	constraint	on	object-seeing,	which	is	something	Brewer	thinks	the	Object	View	does	very	well	at	explaining.			 Similarity	constraint:	The	only	ways	F	that	o	can	look	to	S	in	C	fall	within	o’s	similarity	range	in	C.			Some	commentators	have	questioned	whether	there’s	a	notion	of	paradigm	Fs	that	can	play	the	role	Brewer	assigns	to	it	in	his	theory.15	I’ll	raise	a	related	question	in	section	2.4.	For	now	I’m	going	to	grant	there	is	such	a	notion	so	that	we	can	focus	on	the	rest	of	Brewer’s	argument	from	object-seeing.																																																									14	“The	nature	of	the	experience	itself	is…elucidated	by	reference	to	those	very	things	that	are	presented	in	perception”	(141).	15	Pautz	(2010),	Block	(2019).	
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2.3	Brewer’s	negative	case	for	the	Object	View	On	its	own,	the	similarity	constraint	entails	nothing	about	what	phenomenal	character	consists	in,	including	whether	experience	is	object-dependent.	For	all	it	says,	phenomenal	character	could	be	explanatorily	more	fundamental	than	object-seeing,	contrary	to	Brewer’s	Object	View.		Brewer’s	key	line	of	reasoning	favoring	the	Object	View	is	that	it	easily	explains	the	similarity	constraint	on	object-seeing.		On	its	own,	this	positive	case	doesn’t	get	very	far,	even	if	we	assume	that	the	similarity	constraint	should	be	met.	For	all	it	says,	other	theories	could	equally	well	or	better	respect	the	same	constraint.	Brewer	seems	sensitive	to	this	fact,	because	much	of	his	case	for	the	Object	View	emerges	from	criticizing	a	position	he	calls	the	Content	View,	the	chief	opponent	considered	in	his	book	and	a	foil	that	structures	the	discussion.		The	main	criticism	of	the	Content	View	is	that	it	struggles	to	accommodate	the	supposed	limits	on	the	ways	things	can	look	(74).		The	position	Brewer	criticizes	here	under	the	label	“Content	View”	is	suspiciously	inflected	with	his	own	commitments.	Philosophers	since	Anscombe	who	argue	that	it’s	useful	to	analyze	perceptual	experience	in	terms	of	contents	standardly	formulate	their	position	in	terms	of	phenomenal	character,	either	as	a	supervenience	thesis	or	a	universal	generalization.	And	many	of	us	deny	that	phenomenal	character	is	object-dependent	by	being	analyzable	in	terms	of	perceptual	relations,	or	remain	neutral	on	this	question.	The	position	I	call	“The	Content	View”	in	The	Contents	of	Visual	Experience	is	that	all	visual	perceptual	experiences	have	contents.16	More	committal	theses	of	representation	claim	at	a	minimum	that	phenomenal	character	supervenes	on	representational	properties.17	None	of	these	theses	say	anything	about	perceptual	relations.		By	contrast,	Brewer	saddles	the	Content	View	with	commitments	shared	by	his	own	Object	View,	and	more	generally	with	the	quest	for	an	heir	to	Russellian	acquaintance.		He	assumes	that	a	single	category	analyzes	both	phenomenal	character	and	perceptual	relations,	and	his	main	disagreement	with	the	Content	View	construed	in	his	way	then	concerns	whether	that	single	category	is	the	acquaintance	relation,	as	per	the	Object	View,	or	content.	Here’s	a	passage	showing	Brewer’s	assumption	at	work:		“According	to	(CV)	[the	Content	View	as	Brewer	defines	it],	the	most	fundamental	account	of	our	perceptual	relation	with	the	physical	world	is	to	be	given	in	terms	of	the	representational	content	of	perceptual	experience….[for	example],	it	is	o	that	looks	F	because	o	is	presented	in	perception;	and	this	is	presumably	due	to	the	fact	that	the	content	of	the	perception	in	question	in	some	way	concerns	o”.		(p.	71)				And	again:		
																																																								16	Siegel	(2010),	chapter	2.	17	Tye	1998,	Byrne	2001,	Chalmers	2004,	Pautz	2009.	
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“If	S	sees	a	mind-independent	physical	object	o,	then	there	are	certainly	(perhaps	infinitely)	many	true	sentences	of	the	form	‘o	looks	F’,	but	I	would…deny	that	S’s	seeing	o	itself	consists	in	the	truth	of	those	sentences	or	can	be	fruitfully	illuminated	by	listing	the	facts	that	o	looks	F1,	o	looks	F2….o	looks	Fi,	etc.,	or	the	fact	that	it	visually	seems	to	S	that	of	is	F1,	o	is	F2…o	is	Fi,	etc.	S’s	seeing	o,	her	perceptual	experiential	relation	with	that	particular	mind-independent	physical	object	is	more	basic	than	any	such	facts	and	is	what	grounds	the	truth	of	all	those	sentences…”	(p.	63).		Brewer’s	presupposition	backgrounds	any	debate	about	whether	phenomenal	character	and	object-seeing	are	related	in	a	way	that	would	preclude	a	unified	analysis	in	terms	of	either	content	or	acquaintance.	And	the	existence	of	such	a	unified	analysis	is	a	central	bone	of	contention	between	the	perception	wing	of	Oxford	realism	and	its	opponents.					Even	on	its	own	terms,	Brewer’s	negative	case	seems	not	to	succeed,	because	even	the	Brewer-defined	Content	View	could	respect	the	similarity	constraint.	So	could	a	content	view	positing	object-independent	contents.	The	constraint	can	simply	restrict	which	contentful	experiences	you	can	have	when	you	see	o.	It	is	also	compatible	with	such	restrictions	to	treat	the	relation	between	contentful	experiences	and	objects	you	see	in	having	those	experiences	as	admitting	no	further	analysis,	beyond	the	fact	that	this	relation	obtains	when	the	subject	sees	o.		In	these	ways,	content	views	are	not	committed	to	taking	contentful	experiences	as	explanatorily	prior	to	object-seeing.		None	of	these	options	figure	in	Brewer’s	discussion.	Their	exclusion	undermines	the	negative	part	of	his	case	for	the	Object	View,	which	leaves	unaddressed	a	wide	range	of	alternatives	to	the	Object	View	that	can	do	what	the	Object	View	is	said	to	do	best.		I’ve	argued	that	Brewer’s	positive	case	for	the	Object	View	needs	support	from	a	negative	case,	but	his	negative	case	ignores	standard	content	views	and	avoids	taking	on	his	main	bone	of	contention	with	them.	I’ve	also	defended	Brewer’s	peculiarly	construed	Content	View	against	Brewer’s	objections,	even	though	I	don’t	hold	that	view	myself.			Dialectical	points	aside,	the	heart	of	Brewer’s	route	to	the	Object	View	is	the	notion	of	visual	similarities	to	paradigms	of	Fs.	So	let’s	consider	how	the	Object	View	is	supposed	to	meet	the	similarity	constraint,	and	why	Brewer	thinks	that	meeting	them	would	join	phenomenal	character	to	perceptual	relations.		
2.4		How	do	visible	similarities	constrain	object-seeing?	According	to	Brewer’s	Object	View,	acquaintance	is	a	perceptual	relation	to	objects	that	explains	why	those	objects	look	the	way	they	do.		Perceptual	experiences	are	3-place	acquaintance	relations	in	which	a	subject	(the	first	relatum)	perceives	an	external	thing	(the	second	relatum),	in	a	specific	sensory	modality,	from	a	given	point	of	view	and	in	specific	circumstances	that	can	affect	the	character	of	perceptual	experience	“such	as	lighting	conditions	in	the	case	of	vision”	(96).		These	last	specifications	(modality,	point	of	
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view,	and	circumstances)	together	form	a	multi-component	third	relatum.18	In	the	visual	case,	which	is	the	only	case	Brewer	considers,	the	ways	an	object	looks	to	you	when	you	see	it	constitute	the	phenomenal	character	of	your	visual	experience.			As	we	saw	earlier,	Brewer	allows	that	the	visible	similarities	an	object	has	can	vary	with	the	“shared	training	and	development”	of	the	perceivers	(104).	Presumably,	which	things	are	paradigms	of	F	can	change	with	such	variations	as	well.	If	you	have	only	ever	seen	yellow	bananas	oriented	downward	from	the	stem,	presumably	these	bananas	will	be	paradigmatic	for	you,	whereas	if	I	have	only	ever	seen	green	bananas	on	the	tree	growing	upward	from	the	stem,	then	visibly	different	bananas	will	be	paradigmatic	for	me.	What	counts	as	a	paradigm	will	then	be	relative	to	a	perceiver,	and	so	will	the	visible	similarities	that	are	defined	in	terms	of	those	paradigms.19				Given	that	visible	similarities	can	vary	depending	on	the	perceiver’s	“training	and	development”,	do	those	similarities	put	any	limits	on	the	ways	an	object	can	look	when	you	see	it?	If	they	don’t,	then	windmills	could	be	visibly	similar	to	paradigms	of	giants,	a	12	year-old	boy	on	a	playground	could	be	visibly	similar	to	a	paradigm	of	a	dangerous	20-year	old	person,	or	to	whatever	each	viewer	considers	to	be	such	paradigms.	And	if	Brewer’s	theory	extends	beyond	vision	(as	Brewer	suggests	in	footnote	4)	then	in	the	gustatory	realm,	water	dyed	red	could	taste	sweeter	than	undyed	water.			In	short,	if	visible	similarities	place	no	limits	on	the	ways	an	object	can	look	when	you	see	it,	then	the	similarity	constraint	is	trivial	and	there	are	no	phenomenal	constraints	on	object-seeing	besides	the	Differentiation	condition.20	And	since	Brewer’s	main	criticism	of	the	Contents	View	is	that	it	fails	to	respect	all	the	limits	on	ways	things	can	appear	(74),	he	seems	to	assume	that	visible	similarities	impose	substantial	constraints.	There	then	have	to	be	some	limits	on	which	visible	similarities	a	subject’s	overall	mental	state	can	help	produce.	What	are	these	limits?						On	the	face	of	it,	this	question	would	seem	answerable	only	by	appealing	to	the	nature	of	perceptual	processing.	The	grounds	for	answering	it	would	then	seem	to	be	a	posteriori.	But	Brewer	doesn’t	discuss	perceptual	processing	or	the	debate	about	which	influences	on	perceptual	experience	by	non-perceptual	person-level	states	are	possible.21	In	this	way,	Brewer’s	meta-philosophy	seems	at	odds	with	his	defense	of	the	Object	View.			Summing	up:	Brewer	argues	for	the	Object	View	by	arguing	that	it	meets	the	similarity	constraint,	whereas	the	Content	View	cannot.	But	if	visible	similarities	impose	no	substantial	constraint	beyond	the	Differentiation	condition,	then	Brewer’s	argumentative																																																									18	Brewer’s	Object	View	has	the	same	structure	as	the	position	defended	by	Campbell	(2002),	which	I	discuss	under	the	label	“Object	View”	in	Siegel	(2010).	19	Block	2019	argues	that	paradigms	have	to	be	relativized	even	further	to	specific	conditions	of	attention.	20	I’m	assuming	Brewer	accepts	the	Differentiation	condition	because	otherwise	you’d	be	able	to	be	acquainted	with	completely	camouflaged	object	even	though	you’re	in	no	position	to	demonstratively	refer	to	it.	21	He	proposes	that	things	can	“thickly	look	F”	when	one	has	a	concept	of	F	and	one’s	experience	makes	it	evidence	that	the	object	one	sees	is	F,	but	cases	of	recognition	do	not	exhaust	the	ways	an	object	can	look.	
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strategy	cannot	get	off	the	ground.	And	if	visible	similarities	impose	substantial	further	constraints,	then	Brewer	needs	further	argument	to	clarify	what	they	are.			
3.	Perceptual	distinctiveness	What	do	we	know	a	priori	about	perception?	McDowell	thinks	there	are	distinctively	perceptual	capacities	involved	in	having	contentful	experiences,	and	both	McDowell	and	Gupta	suggest	in	different	ways	an	a	priori	constraint	on	distinctively	perceptual	relations	that	I’d	like	to	probe	further.				
3.1	McDowell’s	intuitional	contents	In	(2013)	McDowell	suggests	that	the	contents	of	experience	comes	in	two	versions,	depending	on	whether	the	content	is	expressed	by	a	sentence	of	the	form	“o	is	F”	or	by	a	noun	phrase	of	the	form	“that	F”.	He	calls	the	first	kind	of	content	“propositional”	and	identifies	it	with	the	same	kind	of	content	as	judgments	have	(2008,	p.	3),	whereas	the	second	kind	of	content	is	“intuitional”	(in	(2013),	“less	than	propositional”	p.	145),	and	is	distinctive	to	perceptual	experience.	Forming	a	judgment	in	response	to	a	perceptual	experience	with	intuitional	content	will	involve	a	transition	from	being	perceptually	aware	of	the	object	and	some	of	its	properties	to	thinking	about	them,	but	the	same	objects	and	properties	will	figure	both	times.	In	addition,	McDowell	holds,	concepts	are	involved	both	times.	That’s	a	major	difference	from	Evans,	an	early	proponent	of	the	perception	wing	of	Oxford	realism,	since	he	construed	experience	contents	as	non-conceptual.			Whether	the	contents	of	experience	are	intuitional	or	propositional,	the	idea	that	they	help	characterize	subjective	aspects	of	experience	is	incompatible	with	the	construal	of	experience	as	a	mere	affectation	of	the	mind	devoid	of	any	intentional	features.	I	attributed	this	construal	to	Hume.		What	is	the	difference	between	intuitional	and	propositional	contents?	A	first	possibility	is	that	intuitional	and	propositional	contents	don’t	differ	at	all,	as	both	are	object-dependent	accuracy	conditions	for	experiences	such	as	the	condition	that	an	object	o	is	F	if	the	experience	is	accurate;	but	a	difference	is	found	nearby,	at	the	level	of	capacities	used	to	attribute	F	to	o	by	using	the	concept	‘F’.		McDowell’s	account	of	the	difference	is	compatible	with	this	suggestion,	since	it	focuses	on	capacities.	Judgments	by	definition	have	propositional	content,	and	they	are	made	by	“putting	significances	together”	(2008,	p.	9	typescript),	where	“significances”	are	correlated	with	objects	and	the	properties	attributed	to	them	in	the	judgment.	A	perceptual	experience	with	corresponding	intuitional	content,	by	contrast,	results	from	exercising	different	capacities.		Here	is	how	McDowell	describes	the	contrast:		“The	unity	of	intuitional	content	is	given,	not	a	result	of	our	putting	significances	together.	Even	if	discursive	exploitation	of	some	content	given	in	an	intuition	does	not	require	one	to	acquire	a	new	discursive	capacity,	one	needs	to	carve	out	that	content	from	the	intuition’s	unarticulated	content	before	one	can	put	it	together	with	other	bits	of	content	in	discursive	activity.	Intuiting	does	not	do	this	carving	out	for	one.”	(ibid).	
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To	entertain	either	intuitional	and	propositional	content,	the	subject	needs	the	capacity	for		predication.	In	both	cases,	the	subject	attributes	a	property	to	an	object,	using	a	concept	of	the	property	(and	perhaps	also	a	concept	of	the	object	–	I’ll	leave	that	issue	aside).	But	there	is	a	distinctively	perceptual	capacity	for	predication,	and	it	differs	from	the	capacities	one	needs	to	entertain	propositional	contents.			It	would	be	productive	to	clarify	the	central	notions	here,	since	they	characterize	what’s	supposed	to	be	distinctive	about	perception.	First,	can	intuitional	and	propositional	contents	produce	equivalent	accuracy	conditions	on	experience?		Second,	in	what	sense	are	significances	separate	in	propositional	content,	but	unanalyzed	in	intuitional	content?				Compare	a	similar	point	made	in	the	idiom	of	formats	that	are	vehicles	of	representation.	One	might	think	that	a	propositional	format	uses	two	different	vehicles	to	represent	o	and	F,	whereas	an	iconic	format	uses	just	one	vehicle.	By	analogy,	a	single	part	of	a	picture	represents	both	Ducko	and	its	shape,	where	a	sentence	“Ducko	is	duck-shaped”	has	separate	meaningful	parts	that	refer	to	Ducko	and	denote	the	property	of	being	duck-shaped.		If	you	added	that	perceptual	contents	come	in	an	iconic	format,	then	there	would	be	a	unity	to	the	perceptual	representation	not	found	in	propositional	formats.22	And	this	conclusion	sounds	like	McDowell’s	conclusions	about	unity.		McDowell	avoids	the	idiom	of	vehicles	and	formats,	and	perhaps	thinks	these	notions	only	obscure	things.	But	they	allow	us	to	express	a	point	about	perceptual	distinctiveness	seemingly	similar	to	McDowell’s.	So	we’re	back	with	the	second	question.	In	what	does	the	unity	of	intuitional	content	consist,	if	not	in	the	non-separateness	of	vehicle	or	representational	format	of	the	object	and	properties	that	are	characterized	by	intuitional	content?		
3.2	Is	direct	awareness	purely	perceptual?	What	do	we	know	a	priori	about	perceptual	relations?	We	can	approach	this	question	by	considering	an	epistemically	best	case	of	object-seeing.	Suppose	seeing	Ducko	enables	you	to	know	that	he’s	duck-shaped.		We	can	leave	it	open	exactly	what	role	your	visual	experience	plays	in	enabling	you	to	know	this.			McDowell	sometimes	describes	this	type	of	case	as	“direct	access	to	environmental	facts”	(e.g.,	2006),	which	I’ll	abbreviate	by	“direct	perceptual	awareness”,	leaving	implicit	that	it’s	direct	awareness	of	facts	rather	than	just	of	objects.	Peacocke	calls	the	same	thing	“genuine	perception”	in	(2018),	and	I’ll	talk	this	way	as	well.		What	kind	of	psychological	processes	underlying	perception	are	compatible	with	direct	awareness	as	McDowell	construes	it?	For	example,	when	we	see	a	yellow	banana	as	yellow	and	banana-shaped,	but	the	yellowness	of	that	banana	doesn’t	explain	the	information																																																									22	As	per	Block	(forthcoming)	and	Quilty-Dunn	(2016)	among	others.	
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processing	that	produces	the	experience,	can	that	kind	of	process	underlie	direct	awareness	or	not?23			A	principle	that	rules	out	any	such	route	to	direct	awareness	is	the	factive	explanatory	constraint	(FEC):		 (FEC)	S	is	directly	perceptually	aware	that	o	is	F	only	if	o’s	being	F	explains	why	o	looks	F	to	S.24		I’d	like	to	ask	whether	McDowell	accepts	(FEC)	as	a	condition	on	direct	perceptual	awareness.	Can	disclosing	reality,	revealing	it,	encountering	it,	or	bringing	it	into	view	happen	only	when	the	right-hand	side	of	(FEC)	is	true?		Some	commitments	of	McDowell	seem	to	favor	accepting	(FEC).	Direct	awareness	is	factive,	and	(FEC)	entails	that	it	is.	This	parallelism	makes	(FEC)	a	natural	bridge	principle	from	the	idiom	of	direct	awareness	to	the	psychological	processing	that	underlies	such	awareness.	In	addition,	McDowell	characterizes	the	route	to	perceptual	experience	as	“something	on	the	lines	of	a	computation	of	a	representation	of	part	of	the	environment	from	a	pair	of	arrays	of	intensities	and	wavelengths”	(1994,	191).	If	the	“initial	arrays	and	wavelengths”	were	in	turn	explained	by	o’s	F-ness,	when	one	is	directly	aware	of	it,	then	the	computations	McDowell	describes	as	underlying	direct	awareness	would	be	compatible	with	(FEC).		Independently	of	McDowell’s	commitments,	the	(FEC)	might	seem	compelling	as	a	way	to	rule	out	a	type	of	coincidence	known	as	“veridical	property-illusion”.	Suppose	that	by	stimulating	a	subject	Simone’s	brain	area	V1	while	she	looks	at	a	green	cube,	you	accidentally	induced	in	her	an	experience	as	of	seeing	a	green	cube,	when	otherwise	she	would	see	the	cube	as	yellow.	The	intervention	does	not	correct	Simone’s	systematic	error.	But	on	the	basis	of	the	experience	that	the	intervention	helps	produce,	it	would	be	natural	for	Simone	to	form	the	true	belief	that	there	is	a	green	cube	before	her.	Here,	Simone	perceives	the	cube,	and	it	looks	green	to	her,	but	she	does	not	perceive	its	greenness.25		But	there	are	also	potential	pressures	to	reject	(FEC)	that	arise	by	considering	how	perceptual	processing	might	work.	It	doesn’t	matter	if	it	actually	does	work	this	way.	Psychology	is	a	source	of	imagination	rather	than	authority	here.																																																										23	This	question	does	not	conflate	creature-level	perception	with	representations	by	perceptual	systems–	a	conflation	McDowell	rightly	warns	against.	“At	the	level	of	internal	machinery	it	is	useful	to	talk	of	sensory	systems	as	information-processing	devices”,	McDowell	points	out,	“but	for	the	animal	its	sensory	systems	are	modes	of	openness	to	features	of	its	environment.”	I	agree	with	McDowell	that	information	processing	explains	creature-level	perception.	“Information-processing	characterizations	of	the	internal	machinery	figure	in	explanation	of	how	it	can	be	that	animals	are	in	touch	with	their	environment”.		24	A	claim	close	to	this	one	is	defended	by	Peacocke	(2018)	as	a	gloss	on	‘genuine	perception’.	I	implicitly	all	but	endorse	(FEC)	in	Siegel	(2010)	chapter	2.	But	the	considerations	here	suggest	to	me	that	it’s	false,	and	the	putative	counter-examples	I	offer	in	my	reply	to	Peacocke	would	apply	to	(FEC)	as	well	(Siegel	2018)).	25	Johnston’s	(2006)	case	of	the	twins	in	the	Ames	room	has	a	similar	structure.		
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The	(FEC)	rules	out	that	the	route	to	genuine	perception	could	be	holistic	in	the	following	way.	Suppose	that	when	you	see	a	yellow	banana,	the	‘arrays	of	intensities	and	wavelengths’	that	start	off	the	visual	processing	are	explained	by	the	banana’s	shape	and	texture,	but	not	by	its	color.	Drawing	on	stored	information	that	things	with	such	a	shape	and	texture	tend	to	be	yellow,	the	visual	system	generates	a	representation	of	yellowness.	Had	the	banana	been	greyish,	you	would	have	ended	up	with	the	same	representation.	Bananas	are	rarely	grey,	though,	so	your	yellow-banana	experience	could	not	easily	have	been	mistaken.	(And	even	if	the	banana’s	yellowness	did	play	a	more	direct	causal	role,	the	modal	facts	about	how	easily	you	could	be	mistaken	could	be	the	same).		Here,	the	sub-personal	patterns	of	sensitivity	fractionate	in	a	way	that	relies	on	combining	information	from	a	particular	banana	about	its	shape	and	texture	with	generalizations	about	the	color	that	things	with	those	shapes	and	textures	tend	to	have.	In	this	case,	shape	and	texture	are	represented	by	early	sensory	inputs,	whereas	color	is	not.	You	end	up	experiencing	a	yellow	banana	as	yellow,	but	with	no	explanatory	role	for	the	yellowness	of	that	particular	banana.		The	process	is	a	schematic	version	of	cue	combination.26	Processes	fitting	this	general	schema	are	posited	by	some	Bayesian	theories	of	perception,	such	as	Andy	Clark’s	theory	of	predictive	coding,	according	to	which	probabilistic	generalizations	(learned	either	by	the	subject,	by	their	sub-personal	systems,	or	both)	are	used	to	interpret	and	infer	which	low-level	information	is	in	the	environment.27		The	process	I’ve	described	need	not	be	the	only	type	of	perceptual	processing	in	the	mind.28	Perhaps	it’s	a	condition	on	genuinely	perceiving	yellowness	(and	so	perceiving	in	the	epistemically	best	way)	that	the	stored	information	that	bananas	are	yellow	is	derived	from	cases	in	which	yellowness	plays	a	role	more	like	the	role	of	texture	and	shape,	for	instance.	And	non-Bayesian	theories	can	allow	such	cue	combination	as	well.		But	(FEC)	is	a	local	constraint	on	each	experience,	not	a	global	constraint	on	a	subject’s	experiences	as	a	whole.	As	such,	it	rules	out	a	type	of	processing	that	one	can	easily	imagine	getting	off	the	ground	once	a	subject	has	a	well-founded	stored	information	about	the	color	of	bananas.	The	(FEC)	insists	that	in	every	case	of	genuine	perception	that	o	is	F,	the	route	to	experience	is	explanatorily	atomistic	with	respect	to	the	properties	you’re	aware	of.	Your	perceptual	contact	of	o’s	F-ness	cannot	piggyback	on	your	perceptual	contact	with	other	properties.	For	each	F,	o’s	F-ness	(or	the	fact	that	o	is	F)	has	to	explain	why	you	have	the	experience.	By	contrast,	cue	combination	would	make	the	route	to	experience	explanatorily	holistic	with	respect	to	properties	presented	in	experience.		You	could	end	up	being	presenting	with	o	as	F	in	experience,	when	o	is	F,	and	other	conditions	for	knowing	are	seemingly	met,	even	without	the	fact	that	o	is	F	playing	a	causal	or	explanatory	role	in	
																																																								26	For	a	clear	discussion	of	cue	combination	see	Orlandi	and	Lee	(2019).	Thanks	to	Geoff	Lee	for	helpful	discussion.	27	Clark	(2016)	28	Contrary	to	Clark,	who	has	globalist	aspirations	for	his	theory.	
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producing	the	experience.		This	situation	would	be	a	failure	of	the	explanatory	atomism	on	the	right-hand	side	of	(FEC).		Once	we	identify	the	schema	that	puts	pressure	on	explanatory	atomism,	we	can	vary	the	types	of	stored	information	that	might	interact	with	initial	sensory	inputs.	For	instance,	instead	of	information	stored	in	the	visual	system	that	links	color	to	shape	and	texture,	the	stored	information	could	take	the	form	of	person-level	states	such	as	beliefs.	The	resulting	question	would	then	be	whether	it	could	count	as	an	epistemically	best	case	experience.	If	we	found	out	the	processing	frequently	worked	in	a	way	that	was	explanatorily	holistic,	and	therefore	at	odds	with	the	right-hand	side	of	(FEC),	would	it	necessarily	compromise	our	epistemic	situation?	Should	we	conclude	that	we	are	in	those	cases	veridically	illuding	o’s	F-ness,	rather	than	genuinely	perceiving	that	o	is	F?			My	answer	is	that	it	wouldn’t.	I’d	like	to	ask	how	each	of	my	interlocutors	answer	this	question.			If	they	deny	the	(FEC)	by	allowing	that	explanatorily	holistic	processing	can	lead	to	genuine	perception	(aka	McDowell’s	direct	perceptual	awareness),	then	those	experiences	may	no	longer	delimit	the	purely	perceptual	part	of	the	mind.	They	will	therefore	be	unsuited	to	play	a	role	in	grounding	other	forms	of	intentionality	and	so	will	not	be	heirs	of	acquaintance.	Perceptual	experience	and	perceptual	distinctiveness	will	be	dissociated,	leaving	open	the	idea	that	if	there	is	a	distinctively	perceptual	part	of	the	mind,	its	boundaries	may	be	sub-personal.			These	mismatches	mark	a	major	difference	from	Russellian	acquaintance	and	its	heirs.	Since	the	(FEC)	would	rule	them	out	by	ruling	out	explanatorily	holistic	processing,	there	is	indirect	pressure	for	those	who	seek	heirs	of	acquaintance	to	accept	it.		Summing	up	and	zooming	out:	if	McDowell,	Brewer,	or	Gupta	accept	the	(FEC),	then	the	scope	of	genuine	perception	could	turn	out	to	be	much	smaller	than	they	each	seem	sometimes	to	suggest,	if	it	turns	out	that	some	perceptual	processing	is	explanatorily	holistic.	If	any	of	my	interlocutors	think	we	know	a	priori	that	the	scope	of	genuine	perception	is	extensive,	they	would	have	to	rule	out	a	priori	that	perceptual	processing	could	be	explanatorily	holistic	as	matter	of	course.			By	contrast,	if	any	of	them	reject	(FEC),	the	appealingly	extensive	scope	of	genuine	perception	can	be	preserved.	But	rejecting	(FEC)	means	allowing	that	that	perceptual	experience	may	not	reflect	purely	perceptual	capacities.			I’ve	highlighted	aspects	of	Brewer	and	McDowell’s	thought	that	aim	at	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	is	an	exercise	of	distinctively	perceptual	capacities,	and	the	routes		to	perceptual	experience	engage	purely	perceptual	parts	of	the	mind,	unaffected	by	non-perceptual	person-level	mental	states.	I	conclude	that	their	theories	and	methods	create	competing	pressures	for	them	both	to	accept	(FEC)	and	to	reject	it.	This	instability	makes	their	construals	of	perceptual	experience	uneasy	heirs	of	acquaintance.			
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4.	Phenomenal	character	and	epistemic	contributions	All	of	our	approaches	to	the	epistemic	role	of	experience	draw	on	our	other	commitments	about	the	structure	of	phenomenal	character	and	perceptual	relations.	So	far	I’ve	focused	primarily	on	those	structures.		“Appearances”	for	Gupta	constitute	phenomenal	character,	and	appearances	are	defined	in	relation	to	presentational	complexes,	which	in	turn	are	things	that	manifest	appearances.29			Guptarian	appearances	do	not	consist	in	perceptual	relations,	but	such	relations	play	an	indispensable	role	in	the	analysis	of	phenomenal	character,	as	they	do	according	to	McDowell	and	Brewer.	My	first	question	about	Guptarian	appearances	concerns	their	structure.		
			
4.1	Are	Guptarian	appearances	predicatively	structured?		In	Gupta’s	framework,	object-seeing	is	a	relation	between	two	parts	of	perceptual	experience:	a	presentational	complex,	which	contains	things	presented	to	the	subject	in	experience,	and	the	appearances	which	are	manifested	by	those	things.		If	you	see	Ducko,	then	Ducko	belongs	to	the	presentational	complex,	and	he	appears	to	you	a	certain	way.	So	in	Gupta’s	terms,	when	you	see	Ducko	and	he	looks	a	specific	way	to	you,	Ducko	manifests	an	appearance	to	you.	This	manifestation	relation	is	a	perceptual	relation,	and	object-seeing	is	constituted	by	an	instance	of	it.30		The	Guptarian	manifestation	relation	is	contingent.	A	presentational	complex	does	not	determine	how	any	of	the	things	in	it	appear	to	a	subject.	“Manifestation”	is	a	label	for	the	etiology	of	appearances,	and	Gupta	defines	appearances	as	dimensions	of	similarity	between	experiences,	which	is	captured	in	his	“SubjIdentity”	relation	(as	he	puts	it:	“appearances	capture	identities	along	a	…subjective	dimension.”	(p.	49)).	But	neither	the	manifestation	relation	nor	the	SubjIdentity	relation	specifies	the	internal	structure	of	appearances.	What	internal	structure	do	they	have,	according	to	Gupta?		When	Gupta	describes	appearances	by	saying	“the	cube	‘looks	smaller’”	(p.	49),	smallness	is	attributed	to	the	cube,	and	one	can	undergo	such	an	experience	whether	cube	really	is	small	or	not.	Appearances,	then,	seem	to	be	structured	predicatively.			But	Gupta	also	allows	that	appearances	can	“mirror	the	structure	of	a	presentational	complex”.	Since	presentational	complexes	contain	multiple	elements,	their	structure	would	seem	to	reflect	the	relationships	between	the	elements.	And	Gupta	holds	that	items	of	any	category	can	belong	to	the	presentational	complex.31		Which	relationships	are	these?		How	could	appearances	both	be	structured	predicatively,	and	isomorphic	to	the	structure	of	the	presentational	complex?																																																										29	All	page	numbers	in	this	section	refer	to	Gupta	(2018)	unless	otherwise	noted.	30	More	exactly,	object-seeing	and	the	manifestation	relation	both	have	Ducko	as	a	relatum,	but	object-seeing	has	a	subject	on	the	other	end	whereas	the	manifestation	relation	has	appearances.	Since	you	can’t	see	an	object	(in	the	sense	we’ve	been	discussing)	without	it	appearing	to	you	some	way,	according	to	Gupta,	S’s	object-seeing	o	is	constituted	in	part	by	the	relation	between	o	and	the	appearances	o	manifests.		31	Gupta	(2019),	p.	130.	
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4.2.	Guptarian	views	and	appearances	According	to	Gupta,	perceptual	experiences	contribute	to	rationality	only	by	contributing	to	the	transitions	between	experiences	and	judgments,	where	these	transitions	are	from	experiences	together	with	non-perceptual	ingredients	in	the	mind	that	he	calls	“views”.	Views	include	beliefs,	conjectures,	hypothetical	commitments,	ostensive	definitions	and	even	states	of	aporia	(fn	3,	2018,	CE	ch.	10),	and	in	his	(2006)	book	Empiricism	and	
Experience,	views	are	“the	totality	of	that	person’s	concepts,	conceptions,	and	beliefs”.		As	Gupta	puts	it,	experiences	“render	rational	transitions	from	views	to	judgments”,	as	opposed	to	“bestowing	a	rational	status”	on	those	judgments,	such	as	the	status	of	being	knowledge.		Gupta	calls	this	role	for	experiences	“the	hypothetical	given”	and	compares	that	role	to	a	“valid	argument	schema”	(p.	37).		
	Let’s	return	to	explanatorily	holistic	processing	(from	section	3.2).	It	allows	that	you	could	see	an	object	o	when	it’s	F,	and	when	you	experience	o	as	F,	but	o’s	F-ness	does	not	explain	why	you	have	that	experience.	Instead,	you	sub-personally	represent	a	set	of	properties	G,	and	then	you	or	your	perceptual	system	infer	that	o	has	F	given	that	something	(possibly	o,	or	possibly	the	scene	surrounding	it)	has	G.	Such	inferences	draw	on	stored	information	that	G’s	are	likely	to	be	or	to	be	near	F’s.				Gupta	allows	that	views	can	influences	which	appearances	are	manifested	by	a	presentational	complex	(p.	157,	CE),	so	if	stored	information	counts	as	belonging	to	a	Guptarian	view,	then	Gupta	allows	explanatorily	holistic	processing	leading	to	appearances.			And	in	general,	when	a	subject	combines	with	appearances	with	an	“appropriate”	view,	she	can	know	that	things	are	the	ways	they	appear	(p.	152,	CE).			To	test	the	ways	in	which	Gupta	allows	views	to	influence	appearances,	compare	two	appearances	that	can	combine	with	an	appropriate	view	to	yield	knowledge	that	a	bird	is	in	a	bush.	In	both	cases,	the	subject	draws	on	the	same	capacity	to	recognize	birds,	but	the	role	of	this	expertise	is	different	each	time.	In	the	first	route	to	experience,	the	subject’s	expertise	helps	determine	the	appearance,	not	by	directing	attention	to	the	bird,	but	by	helping	to	generate	the	subjective	character	of	the	experience	through	a	computation	of	the	sort	described	earlier.		In	the	second	route	to	the	experience,	the	appearances	are	generated	independently	of	the	subject’s	expertise,	and	subsequently	combine	with	the	expertise	when	the	subject	forms	a	judgment	that	a	bird	is	in	the	bush.	Does	Gupta	recognize	any	epistemic	difference	between	the	status	of	the	judgment	in	these	two	cases?			
4.3.	Gupta’s	analogy	with	modus	ponens	A	consequence	of	Gupta’s	framework	is	that	what	it’s	rational	to	believe	in	response	to	a	perceptual	experience	can	be	sensitive	to	other	things	you	believed	antecedently.	This	much	seems	correct.	When	I	see	the	person	across	from	me	on	the	subway,	it	can	be	rational	for	me	to	suspect	that	they	play	the	piano	or	sculpt	clay	by	the	look	of	their	hands,	but	only	if	some	part	of	my	Guptarian	view	connects	the	way	the	hands	look	with	sculpting	or	piano-playing.		Another	consequence	concerns	the	analysis	of	rational	dynamics.	How	should	the	mind	as	it	was	at	5	o’clock	change	in	response	to	a	perceptual	experience	had	at	5:01?	Gupta	writes,	
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“rational	dynamics	are	best	understood	in	terms	of	shifting	views”	(fn	12,	p.	40).		I	find	a	tension	between	this	approach	to	analyzing	rational	dynamics	and	Gupta’s	analogy	between	the	rational	role	of	experience	and	modus	ponens.			Let’s	start	with	Gupta’s	analogy,	according	to	which	experiences	and	modus	ponens	show	how	conclusions	of	some	sort	depend	on	premises	or	views.	As	Gupta	sees	it,	one	can	reason	from	experience	in	accordance	with	modus	ponens,	and	the	thing	analogous	to	a	conclusion	is	a	perceptual	judgment	made	in	response	to	the	experience.	Gupta	draws	this	analogy	by	identifying	judgments	that	are	supposed	to	be	made	rational	by	an	experience,	given	a	view.			The	analogy	with	modus	ponens	suggests	that	there	are	always	other	rational	options.	Modus	ponens	puts	constraints	on	the	combinations	of	mental	states	we	may	legitimately	be	in,	and	there	are	multiple	ways	to	meet	these	constraints.	If	you	start	out	believing	P,	and	then	come	to	think	that	P	entails	Q,	rationality	leaves	you	with	several	options	besides	concluding	Q.					When	we	consider	the	full	panoply	of	options,	not	all	of	them	involve	changing	your	beliefs.	If	Q’s	extraordinariness	makes	it	rational	for	you	to	rethink	your	commitment	to	P,	part	of	rational	dynamics	could	be	to	remain	in	inquiry.	Here,	no	shift	in	your	view	regarding	Q	need	have	occurred	–	you	might	never	have	considered	Q	before	coming	to	think	that	P	entails	it.	How	can	this	kind	of	rational	dynamic	be	expressed	in	Gupta’s	framework?		Gupta	allows	that	the	transitions	rendered	rational	by	experience	include	(besides	judgment)	hypothetical	commitments	and	“aporetic”	states	in	which	“a	problem	is	recognized	but	not	yet	resolved”	(p.	100,	326-28	CE).		Since	rational	dynamics	are	shifts	in	view,	views	can	include	aporetic	states,	and	changes	in	views	include	transitions	into	an	out	of	aporia.32					But	aporia,	construed	as	a	state	in	which	a	“problem	is	recognized	but	not	yet	resolved”	does	not	account	for	all	the	things	besides	judgment	and	hypothetical	commitments	that	could	be	outputs	of	rational	transitions.	Suppose	you	see	a	segment	of	something	grey,	crinkly	and	oblong	beneath	a	row	of	shrubs.	Because	of	your	beliefs	about	what	elephant	trunks	look	like,	when	you	see	the	grey	thing	“Wow,	an	elephant!”	immediately	passes	through	your	mind.	So	now	you	have	entertained	the	hypothesis	that	it’s	an	elephant	trunk.			I	think	such	a	case	could	include	an	experience	with	the	content	“it’s	an	elephant”.	Gupta	would	disagree,	on	the	grounds	that	the	concept	‘elephant’	is	an	element	of	a	view	and	so	“wow,	an	elephant!”	can’t	characterize	experience	on	its	own.	It	can	only	be	a	response	to	experience.			
																																																								32	Since	aporetic	states	are	a	form	of	suspended	judgment,	here	Gupta	differs	from	analyses	of	suspended	judgment	that	see	it	as	a	negative	condition	rather	than	its	own	type	of	mental	state,	siding	with	Friedman	(2013).	
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It	is	rational	in	this	case	for	the	elephant	hypothesis	to	become	salient	in	your	mind,	but	its	mere	salience	is	not	yet	a	state	of	aporia,	and	it	isn’t	a	hypothetical	commitment	either.	So	what	element	of	a	Guptarian	view	could	constitute	the	becoming-salient	of	the	elephant	hypothesis?	If	there	is	no	such	element,	then	either	entertaining	the	hypothesis	is	not	a	rational	response	to	experience,	or	else	rational	dynamics	are	not	always	changes	in	Guptarian	view.		Once	the	elephant	hypothesis	is	salient,	other	ways	of	changing	your	mind	seem	rational	as	well.	It	could	be	rational	to	reconsider	your	belief	about	what	elephant	trunks	look	like,	or	about	what	experience	you	just	had	(or	are	still	having)	when	you	seemed	to	see	the	crinkly	grey	thing.	It	could	be	rational	to	look	more	closely	to	see	whether	it	really	is	crinkled	in	the	way	an	elephant	trunk	would	be	(according	to	your	view).	Here,	you’d	be	seeking	out	more	information.		Any	of	these	responses	could	belong	to	rational	dynamics,	but	none	of	them	seem	to	constitute	aporia,	or	hypothetical	commitments,	or	judgments.			Thoughts	like	these	and	our	responses	to	them	are	an	integral	part	of	rational	dynamics	because	they	belong	to	rational	inquiry.	In	Gupta’s	framework,	rational	dynamics	are	changes	in	view,	and	so	analyzing	the	rational	transitions	into	inquiry,	the	framework	forces	us	to	decompose	inquiry	into	distinct	elements	of	views.	Gupta	seems	to	construe	views	as	static	features	of	the	mind	that	can	change,	whereas	some	rational	responses	fall	instead	into	the	category	of	mental	actions,	including	reconsiderations,	paying	closer	attention,	or	seeking	more	information.		Another	potential	challenge	for	Gupta’s	framework	concerns	how	best	to	analyze	the	resilience	of	antecedent	views	in	light	of	new	inputs	from	experience.33	How	easy	or	hard	should	be	to	adjust	your	antecedent	belief	that	an	elephant	is	unlikely	to	be	in	the	bushes,	in	light	of	your	experience?		A	natural	way	for	resilience	to	be	reflected	in	Gupta’s	framework	would	be	to	include	a	measure	of	how	powerful	experience	is,	relative	to	an	element	of	a	view.	For	instance,	suppose	one’s	Guptarian	view	includes	a	rational	belief	that	elephants	are	unlikely	to	be	nearby	(element	(i)),	and	knowledge	of	how	elephants	look	(element	(ii)).	One	way	to	express	the	idea	that	these	views	should	not	be	resilient	in	response	to	experience	would	allow	experiences	to	carry	different	weights,	depending	on	what	other	commitments	you	combine	with	them.	For	instance,	experience-plus-element-(ii)	could	have	the	power	to	override	element	(i).	This	approach	would	not	have	to	regard	experiences	as	a	minimal	unit	of	epistemic	power.	But	in	order	to	interact	epistemically	with	elements	like	(i)	and	(ii),		experiences	would	have	to	attribute	various	properties	to	the	things	you	see,	and	thereby	have	a	predicative	structure.		
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